The Maryiand Uniform Trade Secrets Act: A Critical Summary of the Act and Case Law by Babirak, Milton E., Jr.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 31
Issue 2 Spring 2002 Article 3
2002
The Maryiand Uniform Trade Secrets Act: A
Critical Summary of the Act and Case Law
Milton E. Babirak Jr.
Babirak Carr, P.C.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Babirak, Milton E. Jr. (2002) "The Maryiand Uniform Trade Secrets Act: A Critical Summary of the Act and Case Law," University of
Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 31: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol31/iss2/3
THE MARYLAND UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT: 
A CRITICAL SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND CASE LAWt 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("Uniform Act") 2 was originally 
proposed over twenty years ago in the United States by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and now it has 
been enacted in most of the individual states. 3 The Maryland Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act ("Maryland Act") 4 was enacted in Maryland, 
with some modifications to the Uniform Act, and became effective on 
July 1, 1989.5 Just after its enactment in 1990, Peter B. Swann au-
thored an excellent note on the Maryland Act. 6 However, at that 
time, there were relatively few reported Maryland cases on the com-
mon law of trade secrets and no reported cases litigated under the 
Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 7 The purpose of this article, in 
addition to reviewing the Maryland Act, is to review over twelve years 
of case law in Maryland since the enactment of the Maryland Act and 
the publication of Swann's Note. To attempt to accomplish these pur-
poses, this article will: ( 1) briefly review the historical development of 
trade secrets law;8 (2) critically summarize the significant provisions of 
the Maryland Act, including a discussion of a few unusual and contro-
2. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT§§ 1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990). 
3. See infra note 60 and accompanying text for the state statutes enacting the 
Uniform Act. 
4. Mn. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§§ 11-1201 to -1209 (2000). 
5. /d. § 11-1201. 
6. Peter B. Swann, Note, Maryland Unifrmn Trade Secrets Act, 49 Mn. L. REv. 
1056 (1990). 
7. /d. at 1061. 
8. See infra notes 15-68 and accompanying text. This article does not cover the 
Economic Espionage Act. See generally]. Derek Mason et a!., The Economic 
Espionage Act: Federal Protection for Cmporate Trade Secrets, 16 No. 3 CoMPUTER 
LAw. 14 (1999), WL 16 No. 3 CLW 14, for a discussion of this topic. 
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versial features of the Maryland Act;9 (3) compare the Maryland Act 
and the Uniform Act; 10 and (4) review most of the significant pub-
lished case law in Maryland concerning the Maryland Act. 11 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE SECRETS LAW 
Epigraphical and literary sources clearly establish that trade secrets 
have existed for many years. 12 Early businesses had trade secrets, such 
as customer lists, secret formulas, methods of production, and vital 
business and financial records. 13 Because trade secrets gave an enter-
prise a competitive advantage, early businessmen must have attempted 
to protect their commercially unique processes and records. Surpris-
ingly, however, the early history of the law governing trade secrets is 
unclear. 14 There is a debate among classical Greek and Roman schol-
ars regarding the existence of legal protection of trade secrets during 
the era when sophisticated Greek and Roman businesses flourished 
and traded throughout the known world at that time.15 One com-
mentator, who cites Justinian and Gaius, argued that during the time 
of the late Republic and early Empire, there was a cause of action 
called actio servi corrupti that provided a remedy in the Roman law to a 
master against a competitor who had enticed a slave to give up one of 
his master's secrets.16 As late as the Middle Ages in Europe, there 
does not appear to be any protection of trade secrets through the ap-
plication of any unified body of trade secret law.17 At that time, trade 
secrets were protected, if at all, through the application of unfair com-
petition laws. 18 
A. Europe 
Trade secret law began to develop with the newfound mobility of 
labor during the Industrial Revolution in Europe. 19 Some early En-
glish trade secret cases were published in the Nineteenth Century.20 
9. See infra 69-115 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra Parts III & IV. 
11. See infra Parts III & IV. 
12. See A. Aurthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi Cor-
rupti, 30 CoLUM. L. REv. 837, 838 n.5 (1930). 
13. See id. See generally jERRY CoHEN & ALAN S. GuTTERMAN, TRADE SECRETS 
PROTECTION AND EXPLOITATION 5-7 (1998) (hereinafter CoHEN & 
GuTrERMAN]. 
14. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
15. See Schiller, supra note 12, at 837-38. 
16. Id. at 839 & n.18. 
17. Id. at 837. 
18. Id. 
19. The relationship between current trade secret law and the mobility of em-
ployees is discussed in Edmund W. Kitch, The Expansion of Trade Secrecy Pr~ 
tection and the Mobility of Management Employees: A New Problem for the Law, 4 7 
S.C. L. REv. 659 (1996). 
20. See COHEN & GuTrERMAN, supra note 13, at 6 & nn.8-9. 
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One such case was the 1851 case of Morison v. Moat. 21 In Morison, the 
plaintiff was granted an injunction to restrain the defendant from us-
ing a secret for compounding a medicine named "Morison's Universal 
Medicine."22 The defendant had acquired knowledge of the secret 
process to make the medicine, which was not patented, in violation of 
a contract and in breach of good faith. 23 However, this case was not 
the first trade secret case of industrial England. 24 The Vice-Chancel-
lor, who wrote the opinion, noted that by 1851 the court had heard 
trade secret cases before and stated " [ t] hat the Court has exercised 
jurisdiction in cases of this nature does not, I think, admit of any 
question."25 
B. Early American Trade Secret Case Law 
Possibly the first reported American case involving trade secrets was 
the 1837 case of Vickery v. Welch, 26 which involved the sale of a choco-
late mill in Braintree, Massachusetts.27 In the sales agreement for the 
mill, the seller agreed to sell the mill, to convey to the buyer the secret 
as to how to make the chocolate, and to deliver a written assurance 
that he would not give the secret to anyone else.28 Two or three other 
persons in the company had knowledge of the seller's secret, but they 
had given a written oath not to divulge it. 29 The buyer tendered the 
consideration. 30 
Upon advice of counsel, the seller refused to tender to the buyer 
the written promise not to convey his secret art to others.31 The seller 
argued that if he so bound himself, it would be an unlawful restraint 
of trade.32 The Massachusetts court upheld the terms of the contract 
and ordered the seller not to disclose the secret to others. 33 The 
court reached the conclusion that there was no restraint of trade in 
this case because it was "of no consequence to the public whether the 
secret art be used by the plaintiff or by the defendant."34 
21. 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (Ch. 1851). 
22. Jd. at 493. 
23. Id. at 501. 
24. Id. at 498. The court stated that "[t]he case of Green v. Folgham . .. where 
the Court decreed an account against a party to whom a secret of this na-
ture had been entrusted, might perhaps be accounted for upon the ground 
that the Defendant in that case had expressed himself to be trustee of the 
secret." !d. (citations omitted). 
25. Id. 
26. 36 Mass. 523 ( 1837). 
27. Jd. 
28. Id. at 523-24. 
29. Jd. at 524. 
30. Id. 
31. Jd. 
32. Id. at 525. 
33. Id. at 527. 
34. Id. 
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The earliest reported case in Maryland that specifically involved an 
alleged trade secret was possibly Fulton Grand Laundry Co. v. Edward 
]ohnson.35 This may have been Maryland's earliest case because the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that it could not locate any prior 
decisions in the court of appeals, nor could it find any decisions that 
dealt specifically with trade secrets. 36 The case involved a list of cus-
tomers on a laundry route used by an employee of the laundry com-
pany.37 The employee left the laundry company and used the list to 
start his own business.38 The court held that the identity of the cus-
tomers on the laundry route was not a trade secret: 
The decisions in this country and in England seem to be 
fairly harmonious in principle as to the duty of courts to pro-
tect owners of trade secrets from disclosure by employees, 
but the divergences begin when the question to be deter-
mined in particular cases is, whether the thing sought to be 
protected should be classed as a trade secret. And this is the 
real question presented in this case. 
A thing can hardly be said to be a secret, in the sense that it 
should be guarded by a court of equity, which is susceptible 
of discovery by observation, and which is open to the obser-
vation of any one who thinks it worth while to observe.39 
C. Judiciary Attempts to Formulate a Legal Theory to Encompass Trade 
Secrets 
As more and more of these early cases were heard in England and 
America, the judiciary attempted to formulate a unified comprehen-
sive legal theory to justify the protection of trade secrets. In the above 
mentioned 1851 case of Morison v. Moat, 40 the English court was al-
ready focusing on the theoretical basis for the protection of trade 
secrets: 
[D]ifferent grounds have indeed been assigned for the exer-
cise of that jurisdiction. In some cases it has been referred to 
property, in others to contract, and in others, again, it has 
been treated as founded upon trust or confidence, meaning, 
as I conceive, that the Court fastens the obligation on the 
conscience of the party, and enforces it against him in the 
same manner as it enforces against a party to whom a benefit 
is given the obligation of performing a promise on the faith 
of which the benefit has been conferred; but, upon whatever 
35. 140 Md. 359, 117 A. 753 (1922). 
36. /d. at 361, 117 A. at 753. 
37. /d. at 360, 117 A. at 753. 
38. /d. 
39. /d. at 361,117 A. at 753. 
40. See supra notes 21-24. 
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grounds the jurisdiction is founded, the authorities leave no 
doubt as to the exercise of it.41 
Even today, there does not appear to be any singular underlying 
legal theory to justify the protection of trade secrets. While the need 
for the protection of such secrets is virtually uncontroverted in most 
Western countries, the several legal theories used to justify trade se-
cret legislation do so only partially and inadequately.42 
1. Property Right of Owner 
Early trade secret cases and some current trade secret cases justify 
the protection of trade secrets as a property right of the owner of the 
trade secret.43 However, this theory does not work in all cases. For 
example, trade secret law provides that the owner of a trade secret has 
no right to protect it if that secret is acquired by others who develop it 
on their own by proper means. 44 Also, protection of a trade secret will 
be lost, and others will be able to exploit it, if the secret is inadver-
tently or even improperly disclosed to the public or if the secret enters 
the public domain.45 Clearly, these examples are inconsistent with 
the concept of protection of a trade secret based on a property right. 
2. Contract Theory 
Contract theory is another basis asserted for the protection of trade 
secrets.46 However, this theory has limited applicability because in 
many cases a written contract does not exist between the owner of the 
trade secret and the misappropriator of the trade secret. 47 The misap-
propriator may even be a complete stranger to the owner of the trade 
secret.48 A frequent example is the case of a departing employee who 
misappropriates a trade secret from his employer. Typically, the em-
ployee in this type of scenario has not executed a non-disclosure of 
proprietary information agreement or an employment agreement that 
covers trade secrets. 49 
3. General Duty of Good Faith 
Recognizing the obvious inadequacies of the use of the property 
theory and the contract theory to justify the protection of trade 
secrets, legal scholars and jurists advanced the theory that the protec-
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
68 Eng. Rep. 492, 498 (Ch. 1851). 
See generally Kristine M. Boylan, The Corporate Right of Publicity in Federal Dilu-
tion Legislation (pt. 2),J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 5 (2000). 
COHEN & GuTTERMAN, supra note 13, at 12. 
/d. 
/d. 
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., TRADE SEcRETs: A PRACTITIONER's GuiDE 6 (1994). 
/d. 
See, e.g., DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327 (4th Cir 2001). 
See infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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tion of trade secrets is justified on the basis of a general duty of good 
faith. 50 Simply stated, the protection of a person who possesses a 
trade secret from another, who misappropriates it by improper or un-
lawful means, is an issue of fundamental fairness. 5 1 
4. Encourage Development of Technology 
Finally, it has been argued that trade secret protection is justified, 
like patents, to encourage inventors and investors to create, innovate, 
and develop new technologies by protecting their inventions and in-
vestments and allowing them to profit thereby.52 
D. The Restatement Sheds New Light 
Regardless of the absence of a singular and comprehensive underly-
ing theory justifying the protection of trade secrets, during the early 
Twentieth Century, the number of trade secret cases began to in-
crease substantially. 53 Concurrently, prominent American legal schol-
ars and jurists began to draft the first Restatement to set forth the 
general principles of law in an attempt to foster a uniformity in the 
laws of the various states.54 In 1939, in recognition of this growing 
body of trade secret case law, the drafters of the first Restatement in-
cluded an important new definition of a trade secret. 5 5 Comment b of 
section 757b of the Restatement of the Law of Torts defined a trade secret 
as any "formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which 
is used in one's business, and which gives [the user] an opportunity to 
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."56 
E. The Uniform Act 
Mter the publication of the first Restatement's definition of trade se-
cret, it was widely applied by the judiciary to the increasing numbers 
of trade secret cases in the United States. 57 In 1969, the United States 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("Con-
50. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974). 
51. /d. 
52. /d. at 484. 
53. See generally Robert T. Neufeld, Note, Mission Impossible: New York Cannot Face 
the Future Without a Trade Secret Act, 7 FoRDAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
LJ. 883 ( 1997). 
54. CoHEN & GuTTERMAN, supra note 13, at 18. 
55. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw OF TORTS§ 757 cmt. b (1939). 
56. /d. 
57. See, e.g., Associated Perfumers, Inc. v. Andelman, 55 N.E.2d 209, 214 (Mass. 
1944) (holding that merchandising methods do not fall under the defini-
tion of trade secrets); Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. v. Cox, 50 
N.Y.S.2d 643, 66, 651 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding that the process for bonding 
aluminum to steel qualified as a trade secret); Pitt. Cut Wire Co. v. Sufrin, 
38 A.2d 33, 34 (Pa. 1944) (holding that a paper clip machine that the de-
fendant learned of while employed by the plaintiff was not a trade secret). 
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ference") organized a Committee ("Committee") to develop a uni-
form trade secret act. The Committee considered the definition of a 
trade secret used in the first Restatement and formulated the Uniform 
Act's definition of a trade secret, relying heavily on the definition 
found in the first Restatement.58 In 1979, the Conference adopted the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("Uniform Act") and, in 1985, it made im-
portant amendments to the Uniform Act.59 
The Uniform Act soon became recognized in the various states as a 
model for legislation. Currently, forty-two of the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia have enacted a version of the Uniform Act, each 
state varying its legislation to some degree from the Uniform Act.60 
58. For a discussion of the evolution of the various definitions of trade secrets 
in the Restatements since the first Restatement in 1939, see Kitch, supra note 
19, 660-62. 
59. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 434 Commissioner's prefatory note. 
60. The effective dates of each of the state statutes and the citation to the act in 
the state code are: ALA. CooE §§ 8-27-1 to 8-27-6 (1993) (entered effect 
Aug. 12, 1987); ALAsKA STAT.§§ 45.50.910 to 45.50.945 (Michie 2000) (en-
tered effect Sept. 2, 1988); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 44-401 to 44-407 (West 
1994) (entered effect Sept. 27, 1990); ARK. CoDE ANN.§§ 4-75-601 to 44-75-
607 (Michie 2001) (entered effect Mar. 12, 1981); CAL. Crv. CooE §§ 3426 
to 3426.11 (West 1997) (entered effect Jan. 1, 1985); Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 7-74-101 to 7-74-110 (West 1999) (entered effect July 1, 1986); CoNN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 35-50 to -58 (West 1997) (enacted June 23, 1983); DEL 
CooE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001 to 2009 (1999) (entered effect Apr. 15, 1982); 
D.C. CooE ANN. §§ 48-501 to 48-510 (2000) (enacted effect Mar. 16, 1989); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 688.001 to 668.009 (Supp. 2001) (entered effect Oct. 1, 
1988); GA. CoDE ANN.§§ 10-1-760 to 10-1-767 (2000) (entered effectJuly 1, 
1990); HAw. REv. STAT.§§ 482B-1 to 482B-9 (1993) (entered effectJuly 1, 
1989); IDAHO CoDE §§ 48-801 to 48-807 (Michie 1997) (entered effect 
1989); 765 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 1065/l to 1065/9 (West 2001) (en-
tered effect Jan. 1, 1988); IND. CooE ANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to 24-2-3-8 (Michie 
1996) (enacted Feb. 25, 1982); IowA CooE ANN. §§ 550.1 to 550.8 (West 
1997) (enacted Apr. 27, 1990); KAN. STAT ANN. §§ 60-3320 to 60-3330 
(1994) (entered effect July 1, 1981); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 365-880 to 
365-900 (Banks-Baldwin 1994) (enacted Apr. 6, 1990); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 51:1431 to 51:1439 (West 1987) (enactedJuly 19, 1981); ME. REv. STAT. 
ANN tit. 10, §§ 1541 to 1548 (West 1997) (entered effect May 22, 1987); Mo. 
CoDE ANN., CoM LAw II§§ 11-1201 to -1209 (2000) (entered effect july 1, 
1989); MrcH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§§ 445.1901 to 445.1910 (West Supp. 2001) 
(entered effect Oct. 1, 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 325C.01-325C.08 (West 
1995) (entered effectjan. 1, 1981); Miss. CooEANN. §§ 75-26-1 to 75-26-19 
(1999) (entered effectjuly 1, 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT.§§ 417.450 to 417.467 
(West 2001) (entered effect Aug. 28, 1995); MoNT. CooE ANN.§§ 30-14-401 
to 30-14-409 (1999) (entered effect 1985); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 87-501 to 
87-507 (1999) (entered effect July 8, 1988); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 600A.010 to 600A.100 (1999) (entered effect Mar. 5, 1987); N.H. REv. 
STAT. ANN.§§ 350-B:1 to 350-B:9 (1995) (entered effectjan. 1, 1990); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to 57-3A-7 (Michie 2000) (enacted Apr. 3, 1989); 
N.D. CENT. CooE §§ 47-25.1-01 to 47-25.1-08 (1999) (entered effectjuly 1, 
1983); OHIO REv. CooE ANN. §§ 1333.61 to 1333.69 (West 1993) (entered 
effect july 20, 1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 78, §§ 85-94 (West 1995) (entered 
effect Nov. 1, 1986); OR. REv. STAT.§§ 646.461 to 646.475 (1999) (entered 
effect jan. 1, 1988); R.I. GEN. LAws§§ 6-41-1 to 6-41-11 (2001) (entered 
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Since its adoption by the Conference and enactment by various states, 
the Uniform Act has been interpreted and redefined by numerous 
state courts.61 Maryland's judiciary has also provided judicial gloss to 
the Uniform Act from the time that the Maryland Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act took effect on July 1, 1989.62 
F. International Trade Secret Law 
Because so many states have enacted a version of the Uniform Act, 
and because there has been so much litigation based on it, it is plausi-
ble to conclude that not only is trade secret law here to stay as a dis-
tinct and unified body of law, but that it will also continue to develop 
into a more comprehensive body of law in Maryland and throughout 
the United States. Other countries are also adopting some form of 
trade secrets law. 63 Some of those countries are following the format 
and concepts of the Uniform Act.64 However, some of the United 
effect July 1, 1986); S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 39-8-10 to 39-8-130 (Law. Co-op. 
Supp. 2001) (entered effect May 21, 1997); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws§§ 37-29-1 
to 37-29-11 (Michie 2000) (entered effect July 1, 1988); UTAH CoDE ANN. 
§§ 13-24-1 to 13-24-9 (2001) (entered effect May 1, 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 9, §§ 4601-09 (Supp. 2001) (entered effect July 1, 1996); VA. CoDE ANN. 
§§ 59.1-336 to 59.1-343 (Michie 2001) (entered effectJuly 1, 1986); WASH. 
REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 19.108.010 to 19.108.940 (West 1999) (entered effect 
Jan. 1, 1982); W.VA. CoDE ANN.§§ 47-22-1 to 47-22-10 (Michie 1999) (en-
tered effectJuly 1, 1986); W1s. STAT. ANN§§ 134.90 (West 2001) (entered 
effect Apr. 24, 1986). 
61. See, e.g., Zemco Mfg., Inc. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 759 N.E.2d 239, 
245 (lnd Ct. App. 2001) (applying and discussing the Indiana Trade 
Secrets Act); Titus v. Rheitone, Inc., 758 N.E.2d 85, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) 
(same); Home Pride Foods, Inc. v. Johnson, 634 N.W.2d 774, 781 (Neb. 
2001) (defining trade secret under Nebraska law); Combs & Assocs., Inc., v. 
Kennedy, 555 S.E.2d 634, 639-40 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing what con-
stitutes a trade secret under the laws of North Carolina). 
62. See, e.g., Diamond v. T. Rowe Price Assocs., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 372, 411 (D. 
Md. 1994) (applying and discussing the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act); Bond v. Polycycle, Inc., 127 Md. App. 365, 732 A.2d 970, 977 (1999) 
(applying and discussing the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act); Optic 
Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 87 Md. App. 770, 784, 591 A.2d 578, 585 (1991) 
(applying and discussing the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act). Many 
trade secrets cases are arbitrated, mediated or settled by the parties for vari-
ous reasons such as cost-effectiveness and privacy. See COHEN & GuTTER-
MAN, supra note 13, at 225-26, 228, 235. 
63. See, e.g., Yuan Cheng, Legal Protection of Trade Secrets in the People's Republic of 
China, 5 PAc. RIM L. & PoL'vJ. 261 (1996) (discussing how the ambiguity of 
China's law for preventing unfair competition affects remedies for misap-
propriating an employer's trade secret). But see Anuja Rajbhandary, Protect-
ing Trade Secrets Through Family Businesses: A Case Study on Nepal, 16 INT'L 
REv. L. & EcoN. 483 (1996) (utilizing empirical evidence to demonstrate 
that companies opt to hire family members when there are legally unpro-
tected trade secrets within the company). 
64. For example, the Czech and Slovak Republics have enacted trade secret 
laws closely following the Uniform Act. See Jennifer Felicia Swiller, The 
Secrets of Success: Confidential Business Information in the Czech and Slovak Re-
publics, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 497, 505-16 (1994). 
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States' major trading partners, such as Canada and the United King-
dom, do not protect their citizens' trade secrets by a distinct and uni-
fied body of law. Generally, those countries apply their existing unfair 
competition laws to protect their citizens' trade secrets.65 Further, 
while it is frequently said that there is no international treaty concern-
ing the protection and exploitation of trade secrets, the United States 
is a signatory to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
("Agreement on Trade"), which requires each signatory to enact legis-
lation for the protection of information. 66 The Agreement on Trade 
describes the required legislation using language very similar, if not 
identical in some respects, to the Uniform Act.67 Other than the 
Agreement on Trade, there is no international treaty concerning the 
protection and exploitation of trade secrets. This may not be surpris-
ing because modern trade secret law is still new and developing. How-
ever, this may change. 68 Governments of both industrial countries 
with multinational businesses and less-developed countries, which de-
sire to promote investments within their country, have good reasons 
to seek the international protection of trade secrets. 
Ill. THE MARYLAND UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 
The Maryland Act regulating trade secrets does not violate the 
United States· Constitution.69 While patents, trademarks and copy-
rights are regulated by federal law, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit has held that a state statute regulating trade 
secrets is constitutional. In Sears v. Gottschalk, 70 the court concluded 
that "the states may protect trade secrets, and we perceive no violation 
of the fifth amendment in federal forebearance to permit that power 
to be exercised. "71 
From a structural point of view, the Uniform Act is somewhat unu-
sual in that its significant provisions are contained in section 1, which 
65. PERRITT, supra note 46, at 572-73. 
66. Kitch, supra note 19, at 659-60. 
67. The United States is a signatory to the Agreement on Trade Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (en-
tered into force January 1, 1995). Article 39 of this Agreement requires the 
United States and other signatories "'to provide legal protection for undis-
closed information of private parties when disclosed or used contrary to 
honest commercial practices."' Kitch, supra note 19, at 660; see also Raj 
Bhala & Kevin Kennedy, World Trade Law 1116 (Lexis Law Publishing 
1998). Because trade secret law is a matter governed by state law, rather 
than federal law, compliance by the United States with the Agreement is 
based on state law compliance. !d. 
68. See supra notes 12-62 for a short history of trade secret law. 
69. Sears v. Gottchalk, 502 F.2d 122 (1974). 
70. /d. at 132 (1974) (relying on Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 
470, 485 (1974)). 
71. !d. 
2002] The Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act 191 
provides the definitions of the relevant terms found in the Act.72 The 
Maryland Act follows the Uniform Act's format in this regard.73 
A. Definition of "Trade Secret" 
Commentators of the first Restatement clearly recognized that "[a] n 
exact definition of a trade secret is not possible."74 In recognition of 
this difficulty, the definition of trade secret found in the Act and the 
Maryland Act is not specific.75 In Section 11-1201 (e) of the Maryland 
Act, a trade secret is defined as "information, including but not lim-
ited to, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, 
technique or process."76 This broad definition is similar to the defini-
tion found in the first Restatement of Torts, which defined a trade secret 
as any "formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which 
is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to ob-
tain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."77 
In optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 78 the Court of Special Appeals of Ma-
ryland stated that: (1) "[t]o the extent that the Restatement presents a 
narrower view, the [Maryland] Act pre-empts that definition [of a 
trade secret];"79 and (2) "[a]lthough all of the Restatement's factors 
no longer are required to find a trade secret, those factors still provide 
helpful guidance to determine whether the information in a given 
case constitutes 'trade secrets' within the definition of the statute."80 
In the Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. FMC Corp./Agricultural 
Products Group,81 the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland cited Bond v. Polycycles lnc.82 for a recitation of the Restate-
ment's six factors: 
(i) the extent to which the information is known outside of 
his [the employer's] business; (ii) the extent to which it is 
known by employees and others involved in his business; (iii) 
72. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1, 14 U.L.A. 437 (noting that in most statutes, 
the definition section merely defines terms and does not contain much sub-
stantive law, while in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the definition section 
contains much of the Act's substantive law). 
73. Mo. CooE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ ll-1201(e). 
74. REsTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 757 cmt. b. 
75. See Mo. CooE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ ll-1201(e); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr 
§ 1, 14 U.L.A. 438. 
76. Illinois, Maine, Virginia, and West Virginia have also added the phrase "but 
not limited to." 765 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 165/2(d) (West 2001); ME. REv. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1542(4) (West 1997); VA CooE ANN.§ 59.1-336 (Michie 
2001); W.VA. CODE ANN.§ 47-22-(d) (Michie 1999). Alabama requires that 
the information posess specific characteristics. ALA. CooE § 8-27-2(1) 
(1993). 
77. REsTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 757 cmt. b. 
78. 87 Md. App. 770, 591 A.2d 578 (1991). 
79. Id. at 783, 591 A.2d at 585. 
80. Id. at 784, 591 A.2d at 585. 
81. 107 F. Supp. 2d 684 (D. Md. 2000). 
82. 127 Md. App. 365, 732 A.2d 970 (1999). 
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the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of 
the information; (iv) the value of the information to him and 
to his competitors; (v) the amount of effort or money ex-
pended by him in developing the information; and (vi) the 
ease or difficulty with which the information could be prop-
erly acquired or duplicated by others.83 
It is significant to note that the definitions in the Maryland Act, the 
Uniform Act, and the first Restatement not only cover high-tech trade 
secrets, like computer programs,84 but "low-tech" secrets as well.85 
Some common examples of low-tech trade secrets include customer 
lists,86 pricing information,87 financial information,88 marketing strat-
egies,89 and methods of conducting business.90 In contrast to patent 
law, the definitions of trade secrets in the Maryland Act, Uniform Act, 
and the Restatement do not require that the information exist in some 
tangible format. 91 In fact, the information can be an idea, theory, or 
concept.92 Further, while no Maryland court seems to have specifi-
cally addressed the issue, other courts have found that these defini-
tions of trade secrets do not require that the trade secret be novel. 93 
Several courts outside of Maryland have held that novelty is not a re-
quirement for a trade secret but that maintaining its secrecy is neces-
sary.94 Unlike patent law, those definitions do not impose any limit 
83. Home Paramount, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 692-93. 
84. For example, sophisticated mining software as described in Trandes Corp. v. 
Guy F. Atkinson, Co., 996 F.2d 655, 664 (4th Cir. 1993), and analyzing im-
mense volumes of data, discussed in DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 
245 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 2001). 
85. See, e.g., Home Paramount, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 692 (holding that a customer 
list is a trade secret). 
86. Id. at 692. 
87. See SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1260 (3d Cir. 1985). 
88. Motor City Bagels, L.L.C. v. American Bagel Co., 50 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D. 
Md. 1998). 
89. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114, 1121 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1982). 
90. See Home Paramount, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 693; Optic Graphics, 87 Md. App. at 
781, 591 A. 2d at 584. 
91. See 1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS§ 1.01[1] (2001). 
92. See id. 
93. Speny Rand Corp., 325 F. Supp. at 1219; Bond, 127 Md. App. at 371, 723 A.2d 
at 973. 
94. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (noting that 
"novelty in the patent law sense, is not required for a trade secret"); Avtec 
Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 575 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that the "hall-
mark of a trade secret is not its novelty but its secrecy"); Space Aero Prods. 
Co. v. R.E. Daning Co., 238 Md. 93, 109, 208 A.2d 74, 82 (1965) (explaining 
that secrecy is required for 'judicial protection"); Operations Research, 
Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 558, 217 A.2d 375, 380 
( 1965) (stating that secrecy is an "essential element"); Optic Graphics, Inc. 
v. Agee, 87 Md. App. 770, 778, 591 A.2d 578, 587 (1991) (stating that a 
requirement for finding something to be a trade secret is that it "be the 
subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy"). 
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on the length of time a trade secret can be protected. While patents 
may be protected by statute for twenty years, trade secrets may be pro-
tected as long as their secrecy is maintained, they are not generally 
known, and they are not readily ascertainable.95 The Maryland Act 
and the Uniform Act require only the acquisition of the trade secret 
for misappropriation, excluding any mention of motivation.96 
Significantly, in contrast to patent law, under the Maryland Act, the 
Uniform Act, and the Restatement, the right to a trade secret need not 
be exclusive.97 It seems that this concept has been accepted from the 
very beginning of trade secret case law.98 Even the 1851 English case 
of Morison v. Moaf9 refers to the non-exclusivity of trade secrets. 100 By 
non-exclusivity, it is meant that two entities, which concurrently but 
independently develop the same trade secret, may both acquire rights 
to it. 101 For example, a business in Garrett County, Maryland may de-
velop a technique to produce multiple clones of a renowned Mary-
land law professor in order to provide uniformly excellent legal 
instruction throughout the State. That business may seek to protect 
that technique as a trade secret. Another business in Baltimore, Mary-
land may subsequently and independently develop the very same tech-
nique102 and also seek to protect it as a trade secret. The Baltimore 
company's acquisition, use, and disclosure of that technique is not a 
violation of the Garrett County company's trade secret and both com-
95. 35 U.S.C. § 154(2) (1994) (stating that "such grant shall be for a term be-
ginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from 
the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United 
States ... "); see also Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 475; REsTATEMENT OF TORTS 
§ 757. 
96. Mo. CooE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ 11-1201 (c); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 1, 14 
U.L.A. 437. 
97. Compare Mo. CooE ANN. CoM. LAw II§ 11-1201 (c) (3) (making no mention 
of an "exclusive" requirement in the definition of trade secret) and RE-
STATEMENT OF ToRTS§ 757 cmt. a (stating that "[t]he suggestion that one 
has a right to exclude others from the use of his trade secret because he has 
a right of property in the idea has been frequently advanced and rejected") 
with 35 U.S.C. § 154(A) (1) (1994) (stating that "[e]very patent shall ... 
grant to the patentee, ... the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States" 
(emphasis added)) and 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (stating that a patent will not be 
issued if "the invention was known or used by others"). 
98. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. 
99. 68 Eng. Rep. 492, 500 (Ch. 1851). 
100. See id. at 503 (holding that regardless of the fact that another person had 
knowledge of the secret, the holder of the secret was entitled to an injunc-
tion to prevent the other from producing product derived from secret). 
101. See RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS §757 cmt. a (stating that "[o]ne who discovers 
another's trade secret properly ... by independent invention ... is free to 
disclose it or use it in his business without liability"), 
102. Assume that the differences in linguistic style and sartorial resplendence 
between the Garrett County and Baltimore clones are unrelated to the 
cloning technique itself and the technique to create both versions of the 
clones is the same for both versions. 
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panies can protect their secret. However, if the secret becomes gener-
ally known, as discussed below, the right to protect the secret is lost. 103 
Similarly, if the secrecy of the trade secret is not maintained or if the 
trade secret becomes readily ascertainable, the right to protect the 
secret is also lost. 1 04 
In fact, a plaintiff does not need to have ownership rights in the 
trade secret. In DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 105 AT&T unsuc-
cessfully attempted to defend a trade secret misappropriation claim by 
arguing that the plaintif;f did not own the trade secret in fee simple. 106 
DTM alleged that AT&T misappropriated its trade secret. 107 AT&T 
argued that the plaintiff had misappropriated the trade secret from 
the federal government and had no right to it. 108 AT&T also argued 
that it had separately developed the secret.109 The defendant argued 
that to make a prima facie case, the plaintiff had to show that it owned 
the trade secretY0 At trial, the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland disagreed. 111 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the de-
cision in an opinion that contained an analysis of the problems inher-
ent in the application of traditional property law to the Maryland Act 
and trade secrets law generally. 112 The Fourth Circuit concluded that 
"fee simple ownership in its traditional sense is not an element of a 
trade secrets misappropriation claim in Maryland."113 
While the definitions of a trade secret found in both the Maryland 
Act and the Uniform Act are relatively similar to the definition found 
in the Restatement, there is at least one significant difference. The Ma-
ryland Act and the Uniform Act do not require continuous use of the 
trade secret in a business or even any use at all; the first Restatement 
requires the trade secret to be used in a businessY 4 The Maryland 
Act and the Uniform Act do not require this because it protects the 
trade secret of an owner who has not yet begun his business, not yet 
had the opportunity or acquired the means to put the trade secret to 
use, has temporarily stopped use, or has determined that the secret 
103. Space Aero Prods. Co. v. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 109-10, 208 A.2d. 74, 82 
(1965) (stating that "[a]bsolute secrecy is not essential but a substantial 
element of secrecy must exist so that there would be difficulty in others 
properly acquiring the information"). 
104. See Swann, supra note 6, at 1059 (stating that "rights in a trade secret persist 
as long as the holder maintains the requisite level of secrecy"). 
105. 245 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2001). 
106. See id. at 330. 
107. /d. at 331. 
108. /d. at 330. 
109. /d. at 334. 
llO. /d. at 331. 
lll. /d. 
112. See generally id. 
113. /d. at 333. 
ll4. See REsTATEMENT OF ToRTS§ 757 cmt. b; Swann, supra note 6, at 1061. 
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process or method does not work and wants to protect that negative 
information as a trade secret. 115 
B. Definition of Misappropriation 
The initial language of the Maryland Act defines the misappropria-
tion of a trade secret in the same manner as section 1 of the Uniform 
Act.U 6 Section 11-1201 of the Commercial Law article of the Anno-
tated Code of Maryland begins its definition of misappropriation as 
follows: 
1. Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who 
knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by 
improper means; or 
2. Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express 
or implied consent by a person who: (i) Used improper means to 
acquire knowledge of the trade secret .... 117 
It is interesting that both Acts define misappropriation as the mere 
acquisition of a trade secret. us In so doing, the Uniform Act's draft-
ers and Maryland's legislators recognized a commercial reality. Peo-
ple who employ improper means to use or disclose a trade secret of 
another usually try to cover up those misdeeds, thereby making it diffi-
cult to prove their disclosure or use. It makes sense to define misap-
propriation of a trade secret to include the mere acquisition of a trade 
secret, even if a party cannot prove disclosure or use. One can infer 
that a person who acquires a trade secret by improper means is almost 
certainly doing so to use or disclose it at some time. 
The Fourth Circuit has addressed whether the mere acquisition of a 
trade secret by improper means is a misappropriation under the Mary-
land Act. In Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., ug the court held that 
the mere acquisition is sufficient and stated that "[t]he [Maryland 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act] does not require proof of competition, 
but only proof of improper acquisition or improper use."120 The 
court concluded that "[c]onsequently, Atkinson's improper acquisi-
115. See Swann, supra note 6, at 1062. 
116. Compare Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1201(c) with UNIF. TRADE 
SECRETS AcT§ 1, 14 U.L.A. 437. 
117. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ 11-1201(c)(1-2). 
118. Compare id. with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 1, 14 U.L.A. 437. 
119. 996 F.2d 655, 657 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting the facts in the case involve a 
computer program that was acquired and disclosed by defendants). 
120. /d. at 665; see also Mo. CoDE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ 11-1201(c); cf Schalk v. 
State, 767 S.W.2d 441, 449 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that acquisition 
without use constituted theft of trade secrets); Computer Print Sys., Inc. v. 
Lewis, 422 A.2d 148, 154 (1980) (stating that the mere acquisition of com-
puter programs through the breach of a duty of confidentiality creates lia-
bility); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS§ 757 cmt. c (stating that "mere disclosure 
enhances the possibility of adverse use" and may reduce the value of a trade 
secret). 
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tion and use of the object code constitutes a misappropriation in vio-
lation of the MUTSA."121 
The Maryland Act continues its definition of misappropriation to 
include the: 
(2) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express 
or implied consent by a person who: 
(i) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade se-
cret; or 
(ii) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know 
that the person's knowledge of the trade secret was: 
1. Derived from or through a person who had utilized improper 
means to acquire it; 
2. Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain 
its secrecy or limit its use; or 
3. Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the 
person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use .... 122 
In this regard, both the Maryland Act and the Uniform Act define 
improper means to include "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach 
or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage 
through electronic or other means."123 
A common example in Maryland case law of a misappropriation in-
volving the use or disclosure of a trade secret is an employee who 
properly obtains a trade secret during the course of his employment, 
but subsequently takes it to use for his own benefit. 124 Generally, an 
employee is under an obligation to protect, and not divulge, any of 
the trade secrets of the employer imparted to the employee in confi-
dence.125 An employee must not use or disclose to third persons, in 
competition with the employer, trade secrets such as written lists of 
names, or other similar confidential matters, given to the employee by 
the employer. 126 However, in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary, after the termination of employment an employee may use 
general information concerning the method of business of the em-
ployer and the names of the employer's customers retained in his or 
her memory, if not acquired in violation of any duty to the em-
121. Trandes Corp., 996 F.2d at 665. 
122. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ ll-1201(c)(2). 
123. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1201 (b). 
124. See Md. Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 32, 382 A.2d 564, 564 (1978) 
(discussing a scrap metal processor who brought action against two former 
high-level managerial employees who utilized secret knowledge to subse-
quently form rival corporations); Bond v. Polycycle, Inc., 127 Md. App. 365, 
732 A.2d 970 (1999) (noting that a former president was sued after misap-
propriating technology after he left the company). 
125. See infra notes 128-63 and accompanying text. 
126. See infra notes 182-89 and accompanying text. 
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player. 127 On the other hand, if the employee departs his employ-
ment with information, even if the information is a trade secret, there 
is no actionable misappropriation if the employee does not acquire 
the trade secret by improper means or use. In Diamond v. T. Rowe Price 
Associates, Inc. 128 a departing employee left work and took approxi-
mately 10,000 pages of documents with her. 129 Plaintiff offered no 
evidence that the former employee acquired the documents by im-
proper means or used or disclosed them. 130 The court held that with-
out such evidence, there was no violation under the Maryland Act. 131 
Sometimes, trade secrets are acquired by accident or mistake. The 
Maryland Act defines misappropriation to also include: 
Disclosure of use of a trade secret of another without express 
or implied consent by a person who ... before a material 
change of the person's position, knew or had reason to know 
that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been 
acquired by accident or mistake.132 
If a person made a material change in their position before discov-
ering that they had acquired a trade secret by accident or mistake, 
there is no misappropriation of a trade secret. 
The drafters of the Maryland and Uniform Acts may have inserted 
this material change requirement into these Acts in an attempt to bal-
ance the property interests of the trade secret owner with the interests 
of another who acquired the trade secret by accident or mistake, ap-
plying the fairness theory over the property theory. However, the bal-
ancing of these interests may be more easily accomplished, as Virginia 
has done, without the Maryland Uniform Act's material change re-
quirement.133 This may be achieved by prohibiting the disclosure or 
use of a trade secret acquired by accident or mistake if the other had 
knowledge of the accident or mistake at the time of his disclosure or 
use. If he did not have such knowledge when he disclosed or used it, 
the value of the trade secret is still diminished but it is unfair to pun-
ish the other person who used or disclosed it because he had no 
knowledge. On the other hand, it is fair to punish the other person if 
he had such knowledge before he used or disclosed the trade secret. 
If the only impact of the Maryland Act provision and the Uniform 
Act provision concerning the accidental or mistaken acquisition of a 
trade secret was on this very specific and unique fact pattern, these 
provisions would probably effect the outcome of relatively few cases. 
127. 
128. 
129. 
130. 
131. 
132. 
133. 
Dworkin v. Blumenthal, 77 Md. App. 774, 779, 551 A.2d 947, 949 (1989). 
852 F. Supp. 372 (D. Md. 1994). 
Id. at 412. 
/d. 
/d. For another Maryland trade secret cases involving a departing em-
ployee, see Optic Graphics, Inc., 591 A.2d. at 578, 87 Md. App. at 770. 
Mo. CoDE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ ll-1201(c)(2)(iii), (3). 
VA. CooE ANN.§ 59.1-336 (2001). 
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However, these provisions of the Maryland Act and the Uniform Act 
may give rise to an unintended opportunity for misappropriators and 
can be problematic for a trade secret owner. For example, a misap-
propriator can falsely argue that it was not until after he used the 
trade secret that he found out that he had acquired a trade secret by 
accident or mistake. Consequently, it may be difficult for the trade 
secret owner to contest the misappropriator's allegation that he did 
not know he had acquired a trade secret by mistake or accident until 
after he used or disclosed it. The difficulty would be based on the fact 
that only the misappropriator would have information concerning the 
timing of his knowledge of the trade secret; and the owner may have 
difficulty discovering independent evidence to prove the timing of the 
misappropriator's knowledge. 
A discussion of the definition of the misappropriation of a trade 
secret under the Maryland Act or any state uniform trade secrets act is 
incomplete without at least briefly identifying a distinctive line of non-
Maryland trade secrets cases which are sometimes referred to as the 
"inevitable disclosure" or "inevitability" cases. Because the topic of 
this Article is limited, and the inevitable disclosures doctrine is contro-
versial and has been addressed by others, this Article will only briefly 
describe the doctrine.134 A discussion of the doctrine may be helpful 
even though Maryland case law has not addressed it. The theory of 
inevitable disclosure may be useful to Maryland practitioners bringing 
or defending cases with similar fact patterns. Courts outside of Mary-
land have applied this doctrine to enjoin or limit the subsequent em-
ployment, by a competitor, of a departing employee, when it is alleged 
that it is inevitable that the employee will use or disclose the trade 
secrets of his employer when working for the competitor. 135 Signifi-
cantly, the inevitable disclosure doctrine is utilized in cases where the 
employee has not signed, or has even refused to sign, a non-competi-
tion agreement or non-disclosure of proprietary information agree-
ment with his prior employer, and where the employee has not 
threatened, directly or indirectly, to use or disclose the trade secrets of 
his former employer to his new employer. 136 A great deal of contro-
134. For a fuller discussion and differing views of this doctrine and the related 
case law, see Terrence P. McMahon eta!., Inevitable Disclosure: Not So Sure In 
The West, NAT'L LJ., May 12, 1997, at C35; Lawrence I. Weinstein, Revisiting 
the Inevitability Doctrine: When Can a Former Employee Who Never Signed a Non-
Compete Agreement nor Threatened to Use or Disclose Trade Secrets Be Prohibited 
from Working for a Competitor?, 21 AM. J. TRIAL Aovoc. 211 ( 1997). 
135. See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text. 
136. Obviously, courts do not need to apply the doctrine if there were such a 
non-competition or non-disclosure agreement because the case could be 
decided as a breach of contract case. Similarly, if there was a threat of 
disclosure or use, the case could be decided under the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act, without the use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, because 
the Act specifically permits an injunction even for the threat of disclosure 
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versy has accompanied the inevitable disclosure doctrine137 because it 
limits a worker's right to move to a better job.138 This right of mobil-
ity has been widely recognized 139 and has a long history in Mary-
land.140 An analysis of these controversial inevitability cases is 
illuminating because courts deciding these cases must balance the 
right of a worker's job mobility with the right of a trade secret owner 
to protect its trade secret.141 In balancing these rights, the courts set 
forth factors used in reaching a decision, thereby more completely 
describing the boundaries and features of the two rights. 
The three initial inevitable disclosure cases are: B.F. Goodrich Co. v. 
Wohlgemuth, 142 Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Continental Aviation 
& Engineering Corp., 143 and E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American 
Potash & Chemical Corp.144 All three of these cases were decided in the 
mid-1960s and involved a similar fact pattern.145 In each case, the em-
ployer was a leader in its industry because of the technology it devel-
oped. In B.F. Goodrich Co., the technology was the development of 
space suits. 146 In Allis-Chalmers, the technology was advanced fuel in-
jection pumps, 147 and in the American Potash case, it was pigments.148 
In each of these three cases, the competitors of the companies that 
owned the trade secrets could not compete successfully because the 
competitors lacked the technology owned by the industry leader.149 
The competitors attempted to obtain the technology by hiring away 
one of the industry leader's senior scientists or executives who was 
directly involved with and intimately familiar with the subject technol-
or use. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1202; Swann, supra note 6, at 
1068. 
137. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
138. Weinstein, supra note 134, at 211-15. 
139. Id. 
140. Md. Metals v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 39, 382 A.2d 564, 569 (1978) (stating 
that "courts have been receptive to the view that every person has or least 
ought to have the right to ameliorate his socio-economic status by exercis-
ing a maximum degree of personal freedom in choosing employment"). 
141. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text. 
142. 192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963). 
143. 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966). 
144. 200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964). 
145. See infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text. 
146. B.F Goodrich Co., 192 N.E.2d at 102 (noting that the space suits were high-
altitude full pressure space suits). 
147. Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 645 (discussing an employee previously of the 
Allis-Chalmers division for manufacturing fuel pumps who had joined an-
other company looking for a second source of fuel pumps). 
148. American Potash, 200 A.2d at 430 (describing that plaintiff is the only suc-
cessful manufacturer of a pigment product and that employee of plaintiff 
was hired by defendant to gain access to the knowledge). 
149. Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 650 (manufacturing and design of fuel injec-
tion systems and pumps); American Potash, 200 A.2d at 479 (manufacturing 
pigments through the chloride process); B.F Goodrich Co., 192 N.E.2d at 
102 (engineering and development of space suit). 
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ogy of the trade secret. 150 The competitor's purpose was to success-
fully compete with the plaintiff. In all of these cases, the departing 
employee had not signed a non-disclosure of proprietary information 
agreement, had not signed a non-competition agreement when hired, 
and had not threatened to use or disclose their employers' trade 
secrets. 151 In each case, the argument was made that it was inevitable 
that the employee would use or disclose the trade secret of his former 
employer while he was engaged in the duties for which he was hired 
by his new employer. 152 
From the dates of these three cases until 1995, there were very few 
inevitable disclosure cases decided which were actual inevitable disclo-
sure cases. 153 However in 1995, an interest in these cases was rekin-
dled with the Seventh Circuit's affirmation of an injunction in a new 
inevitable disclosure case. In Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 154 Pepsi was mar-
keting and selling a sports drink called "All Sport," which was far be-
hind Quaker Oats' "Gatorade" in market share.155 Redmond was a 
senior executive of a larger Pepsi business unit which included All 
Sport.156 In this position, Redmond knew Alt"Sport's marketing infor-
mation. 157 Quaker Oats hired Redmond away from Pepsi to work on 
its Gatorade and Snapple line. 158 Applying the inevitable disclosure 
theory, the lower court granted Pepsi a preliminary injunction against 
Redmond and Quaker Oats, prohibiting Redmond from any beverage 
pricing, marketing and distribution at Quaker Oats. 159 The Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the injunction. 160 
The Pepsico case is different from the initial three inevitable disclo-
sure cases because in Pepsico, the market leader and not the competi-
tor was the party hiring away an employee with the alleged trade 
150. Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 651; American Potash, 200 A.2d at 430; B.F 
Goodrich Co., 192 N.E.2d at 102-04. 
151. Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 645; American Potash, 200 A.2d at 428; B.F 
Goodrich Co., 192 N.E.2d at 105. 
152. Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 645; American Potash, 200 A.2d at 429-31; B.F 
Goodrich Co., 192 N.E.2d at 103; see also Weinstein, supra note 134, at 227 
n.72. A California appellate court apparently has also adopted the doc-
trine. See Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. Stephen White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680 
( 1999) 0 
153. There are a number of cases in several jurisdictions which are cited by 
counsel as inevitable disclosure cases but which are actually contract cases. 
See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Varco, Int'l, 677 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1982); Union 
Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1984); Weed Eater, 
Inc. v. Dowling, 562 S.W.2d 898 (Tex 1978). 
154. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). 
155. ld. at 1263-64. 
156. ld. at 1264-65. 
157. ld. at 1265. 
158. ld. at 1264. 
159. ld. at 1266-67. 
160. ld. at 1272. 
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secret. 161 In addition, the value of Quaker Oats' trade secret to Pepsi, 
a competitor, was obvious, but possibly less critical than in the three 
prior cases.162 Most troubling was that while the Seventh Circuit opin-
ion acknowledged that the "mere fact that a person assumed a similar 
position at a competitor does not, without more, make it 'inevitable 
that he will use or disclose ... trade secret information' so as to entitle 
plaintiff to an i~unction," 163 the court did not go further to offer 
more guidance as to what does make it inevitable. 
At present, there is no indication in Maryland case law that Mary-
land will adopt, in whole or in part, the inevitability doctrine. 
C. Does Size Really Matter? 
Under the Maryland and Uniform Act's definition of a trade secret, 
the size of or the amount of information contained in the trade secret 
does not matter, assuming the other statutory requirements are 
met. 164 The Maryland Act defines a trade secret simply as "informa-
tion,"165 without any limitation as to the amount of the informa-
tion. 166 In many cases, the size of the trade secret is not a factor 
because the trade secret at issue is specific, singular and limited, such 
as a source code or object code167 or customer or patient list.168 
However, there has been recent trade secret litigation outside of 
Maryland in which relatively large amounts of information are alleged 
to be trade secrets. For example, in the "settled" Virginia trade secret 
case of ServiceMaster v. Pletcher, 169 ServiceMaster, a large national 
franchisor of cleaning businesses claimed that its whole "Business Sys-
tem" was a trade secret.170 ServiceMaster required its franchisees to 
use this Business System to conduct their cleaning business. 171 This 
Business System was compromised of dozens of three inch, three ring 
161. 
162. 
163. 
164. 
165. 
166. 
167. 
168. 
169. 
170. 
171. 
Compare id. at 1264 with Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 647; see American Pot-
ash, 200 A.2d at 430-31; B.F. Goodrich Co., 192 N.E.2d at 102. 
Compare Pepsico, 54 F.3d at 1264 with Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 647; 
American Potash, 200 A.2d at 430-31; B.F Goodrich Co., 192 N.E.2d at 102. 
Pepsico, 54 F.3d at 1269 (quoting AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 
1207 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
See Mo. ConE ANN., CoM LAw II§ ll-1201(e); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 1, 
14 U .L.A. 438. 
Mo. CooE ANN., CoM lAw II§ ll-120l(e). 
!d. 
Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 663 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(defining object code as "'the binary language comprised of zeros and ones 
through which the computer directly receives its instructions'"). 
Dworkin D.D.S., P.A. v. Blumenthal, 77 Md. App. 770, 551 A.2d 947 (1989) 
(noting that patient or customer lists include names and addresses of those 
listed). 
Service Master v. Pletcher, Civil Action No. 00-942-A (court settled date) 
(noting that this case is settled, and there is no confidentiality clause in the 
Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release executed in this case). 
!d. 
!d. 
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manuals, altogether consisting of thousands of pages of text and nu-
merous video tapes. 172 The Business System also consisted of numer-
ous periodic magazines and newsletters, technical bulletins, training 
materials, training seminars, workshops, promotional materials, adver-
tising materials, marketing materials, sales materials, invoices, and cor-
respondence with third parties. 173 These materials covered virtually 
every aspect of initiating, operating, and maintaining a cleaning 
business. 174 
Some courts have held that a whole franchise system can be pro-
tected as a trade secret. In Big 0 Tires, Inc. v. Granada Enterprises 
Corp., 175 the court upheld plaintiff's claim that its whole "Big 0 Sys-
tem," compromised of "techniques, systems, details as to the Big 0 
System, theory and practices, supplier lists, equipment standards, spe-
cials uses of equipment and equipment supplier lists," was a trade 
secret. 176 
In Gold Messenger, Inc. v. McGuay, 177 a franchiser developed a com-
prehensive system for setting up and operating an advertising circular 
business. 178 This system was compiled in an apparently voluminous 
manual. 179 The plaintiff sought to enforce its written covenant not to 
compete against the defendant in Colorado, which statutorily voided 
such agreements unless it was to protect a trade secret. 180 The court 
held that the whole manual was a trade secret.181 
There are other cases in Maryland, 182 and outside of Maryland, 183 
which have held that large volumes of information are protected as 
172. Id. 
173. Jd. 
174. Id. (noting that the franchisor now maintains a web site containing most of 
these materials which is available only to franchises with the proper 
password). 
175. Business Franchise Guide (CCH) 'li 11,607, Case No. CV98-2298DT (C.D. 
Cal. 1990). 
176. Jd. 
177. Gold Messenger, Inc. v. McGuay, 937 P.2d 907 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997). 
178. Id. at 908. 
179. Jd. at 909. 
180. Id.; see also Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2) (b) (West 1994). 
181. Gold Messenger, Inc., 937 P.2d at 911. 
182. Motor City Bagels, L.L.C. v. American Bagel Co., 50 F. Supp. 2d 460, 479 
(D. Md. 1999) (holding that "plaintiff's extensive compilation of informa-
tion and analysis in their business plan qualifies as a trade secret"); National 
Risk Management, Inc. v. Bramwell, 819 F. Supp. 417, 432 (D. Pa. 1993) 
(holding that a combination of information in the proposal book that re-
flected market research gathered from a larger pool of information was a 
trade secret); Picker Int'l Corp. v. Imaging Equip. Svcs., 931 F. Supp. 18, 38 
(D. Mass. 1995) (noting that a set of service and repair manuals compiled 
of both public and non public information by plaintiff was a trade secret). 
183. ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Atlech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1333 (N.D. Ill. 
1990) (noting that ISC's compilations of valuable technological informa-
tion guides, service manuals, and technical bulletins were all found to be 
trade secrets); Comprehensive Tech. v. Software Artisans, 3 F.3d 730, 737 
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trade secrets. If the Maryland Act allows employers or franchisers to 
classify such large volumes of information as trade secrets, then the 
protection of such expansive information could lead to an unin-
tended result. In the case of a departing employee, it may mean that 
he cannot continue to work in the same industry. The employee's 
departure would severely limit his job mobility because the informa-
tion classified as a trade secret by the former employer is so broad that 
it possibly encompasses the whole industry. Because necessity re-
quires that the employee use or disclose some of that information at 
his next job, the employee will be prevented from working in the same 
industry. 
However, the departing employee may defend such a claim by argu-
ing that much of the information for which the employer seeks pro-
tection is general knowledge, publicly available, generally known, 
and/ or readily ascertainable.184 As set forth above, Maryland case law 
clearly protects an employee by allowing him to depart from his em-
ployment with his general knowledge and skills. 185 Information that is 
generally known or readily ascertainable cannot be protected as a 
trade secret. 186 However, in order to restrict employees from using all 
information in their subsequent employment, some employers 
outside of Maryland are attempting to denominate as much informa-
tion as possible as a trade secret. 187 
If an employer can protect large volumes of information as a trade 
secret, the effect of such protection could result in the functional 
equivalent of a non-compete agreement without reasonable limita-
tions as to time or geography. As stated above, trade secrets are not 
limited in this way. 188 This is in contrast to Maryland's case law on 
non-compete agreements, which requires that these agreements be 
reasonable as to time and geography.189 
D. Requirement of Independent Economic Value 
The definition of a trade secret in the first Restatement requires 
that the trade secret give the user an opportunity to obtain an advan-
(4th Cir. 1993) (stating that in order for compilation to be regarded as a 
trade secret the combination of information itself must not be publicly 
available). 
184. Comprehensive Tech. v. Software Artisans, 3 F.3d 730, 737 (4th Cir. 1993). 
185. Space Aero Prods. Co. v. Darling, 238 Md. 93, 113, 208 A.2d. 74, 84 (1965). 
186. Mo. CooE ANN, CoM. LAw II§ 11-1201(e)(1). 
187. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
188. See supra Part liLA. 
189. Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 96, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (1973) ("[A]n employ-
ment contract ... will be upheld 'if the restraint is confined within limits 
which are no wider as to area and duration than are reasonably necessary' 
... " (quoting Ruhl v. Bartlett Tree Co., 245 Md. 118, 123-24, 225 A.2d 288, 
291 (1967); Macintosh v. Brunswick, 241 Md. 24, 31, 215 A.2d 222, 225 
(1965))). 
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tage over nonusers. 190 The Maryland191 and Uniform Act's definition 
of a trade secret requires that the secret information derive "indepen-
dent economic value."192 This quoted phrase, while seemingly un-
fathomable, has been interpreted by the courts to simply mean that 
the trade secret information must give the owner of the secret some 
competitive advantage, whether actual or potential. 193 The Maryland 
and Uniform Acts do not state that the independent economic value 
has to be substantial or significant. 194 The economic value has to be 
more than de minimis.195 In fact, the trade secret need only give the 
owner "an opportunity to obtain an advantage."196 
E. Requirement that Trade Secret Not Be Generally Known 
The Maryland and Uniform Act's definition of a trade secret fur-
ther requires that the trade secret not be generally known. 197 The 
drafters of the Uniform Act and the courts are clear that "not gener-
ally known" does not mean not generally known to the public, but 
instead, means not generally known to those in the relevant industry 
or trade. 198 In trade secret litigation, the requirement that the infor-
mation not be generally known is often a vigorously contested issue 
and it can be a close factual issue for a judge or jury to decide. 199 For 
example, consider whether a particular method of selling a product 
or service is or is not generally known. A company may argue that it 
has developed a program to sell a product or service and that the 
company has spent considerable money, time, and effort on that pro-
gram. 200 The company may have trained its employees to use it and 
190. 
191. 
192. 
193. 
194. 
195. 
196. 
197. 
198. 
199. 
200. 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b. 
Swann, supra note 6, at 1056 (stating that "[o]nJuly 1, 1989, Maryland be-
came the twenty-ninth state to adopt the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ... "). 
Mo. ConE ANN, CoM. LAw II§ 11-1201 (noting that "[t]o qualify as a trade 
secr~t under thi~ title, the information must: (1) hold independent eco-
nomic value ... ) . 
Electo-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 900 (Minn. 
1983). 
See Mo. ConE ANN, CoM. LAw II § 11-1201. 
See Mo. ConE ANN, CoM. LAw II § 11-1201. 
REsTATEMENT OF ToRTS§ 757 cmt. b (stating that" [a] trade secret may con-
sist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information ... which 
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors ... "). 
See Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ ll-1201(e)(1) (stating that a required 
element of a trade secret is that it "[d]erives independent economic value, 
actual or potential, from not being generally known"); UNIF. TRADE 
SEcRETs AcT§ 1, 14 U.L.A. 437. 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 1 cmt, 14 U.L.A. at 437. See generally, Precision 
Moulding & Frame, Inc. v. Simpson Door, Co., 888 P.2d 1239, 1242-43 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that if the knowledge behind a trade secret 
is "readily ascertainable," a plaintiff will not be able to establish that a trade 
secret exists). 
See, e.g., Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 87 Md. App. 770, 788, 591 A.2d 578, 
587 (1991). 
See id. at 781, 591 A.2d at 584. 
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maintain the secrecy of the program.201 On the other hand, an em-
ployee departing that company who wants to use the same program 
for her own benefit may argue that the method is generally known 
because you can read a book at your local public library on sales or 
marketing that would provide information about almost any sales 
method. Further, a departing employee may also contend that the 
sales method is generally known because several of the competitors of 
the company use the same or similar method. 202 This is not unlikely 
in a mature competitive industry. 
In 1999, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland decided a case 
concerning the requirement that an alleged trade secret not be gener-
ally known. In Bond v. PolyCycle, Inc., 203 the two founders of a com-
pany became aware of another company's discovery of a way to 
separate toxins from medical waste and the founders thought they 
could apply that process to recycling plastic.204 The two asked Bond, 
an engineer, to review the technology, and he concluded that it had 
great economic potential.205 Bond estimated that it would take six 
months and about $75,000 to $100,000 to develop the technology.206 
As a result, the two founders and Bond fonned PolyCycle, licensed the 
process from the inventor, and Bond became president of the com-
pany.207 Two years and $500,000 later, the technology was not ready 
and Bond requested a salary.208 The company was not yet profitable 
and refused to pay Bond's request. 209 Bond left, telling PolyCycle he 
had developed an alternative technology that did not belong to Poly-
Cycle.210 He took all of the technology with him, including a ma-
chine, and computer files; he also deleted the computer files from 
PolyCycle's network.211 
Bond contended that the technology was not a trade secret because 
the components of the machine were all available on the open market 
and the fundamental concept of breaking plastics into pieces and ap-
plying heated water and agitation was widely known in the plastics in-
dustry.212 The court disagreed with Bond, holding: 
[O]nly Bond knows the "secret formula" of how small to 
make the pieces of plastic, how much water to use, the ap-
propriate temperature of the water, the proper level of agita-
201. See id. at 775, 591 A.2d at 581. 
202. See id. at 787-88, 591 A.2d at 586-87. 
203. 127 Md. App. 365, 732 A.2d 870 (1999). 
204. !d. at 368, 732 A.2d at 971. 
205. !d. at 369, 732 A.2d at 972. 
206. !d. 
207. !d. 
208. !d. at 370, 732 A.2d at 972. 
209. !d. 
210. !d. 
211. !d. 
212. !d. at 374, 732 A.2d at 971. 
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tion to apply, and the length of the agitation process. As 
appellee correctly points out, "[i] t is those elements, mixed 
and processed precisely in a certain manner, that define the 
PolyCycle process, just as much as the specific blend of ... 
available ingredients defines Coca-Cola."213 
The court also dismissed defendant's argument that the technology 
was generally known in the industry, stating: 
Appellant's knowledge was not acquired by a general study 
of technologies available in the market place. Appellant ac-
quired his knowledge when Marks and Brown offered him 
the opportunity to participate in the joint venture, and later, 
when acting as an agent for PolyCycle, he utilized PolyCycle's 
funds in the development process.214 
Perhaps one of the more interesting trade secret cases concerning 
the meaning of "not generally known" is Religious Technology Center v. 
Lerma,215 involving the Church of Scientology. In 1991, the Church, 
located in California, sued a disgruntled former member of the 
church.216 The defendant in that case filed an affidavit in the open 
court file and attached thereto sixty-nine pages of church docu-
ments.217 The church claimed that the documents were protected by 
the U.S. copyright laws and trade secret laws and sought to have the 
records sealed.218 However, the circuit court upheld the district 
court's refusal to seal the file. 219 Subsequently, Lerma, another for-
mer church member, obtained a copy of the affidavit and the church 
documents, and published them on the lnternet.220 Thereafter, in 
mid-1995, the church obtained a temporary restraining order from 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
against Lerma, restricting Lerma from any further publication of the 
affidavit and church documents, and a United States Marshall seized 
Lerma's personal computer, disks, and copies of the documents.221 
In Lerma, the Church went to great lengths to protect the court filed 
documents from being disclosed.222 The court found that the Church 
had been "checking that [court] file out [everyday] and holding it all 
day to prevent anyone from seeing it, [however,] the file was not 
sealed and obviously was available, upon request, to any member of 
the public who wished to see it."223 In fact, the file was made available 
213. /d. at 375, 732 A.2d at 975. 
214. Id. at 376, 732 A.2d at 976. 
215. 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
216. Id. at 1364. 
217. /d. 
218. /d. 
219. /d. 
220. /d. 
221. /d. at 1364-65. 
222. /d. 
223. /d. at 1365. 
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to a reporter.224 The ever-resourceful Washington Post sent a reporter 
to California and obtained the documents from the clerk of the court 
in the California case. 225 The Washington Post published an article 
about the Church, and following publication of the article, the 
Church sued the newspaper in Virginia.226 
However, despite the fact that the Church had gone to great 
lengths to protect the court filed documents from the public, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held 
that the documents were not a trade secret.227 The court reasoned 
that the documents were generally known because they were in an 
open court file available to the public and they were posted on the 
Internet.228 The court further stated: 
Of even more significance is the undisputed fact that these 
documents were posted on the Internet on July 31 and Au-
gust 1, 1995. (Lerma Affidavit). On August 11, 1995, this 
Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order among other 
orders which directed Lerma to stop disseminating the 
[Church] documents. However, that was more than ten days 
after the documents were posted on the Internet, where they 
remained potentially available to the millions of Internet 
users around the world. 
As other courts who have dealt with similar issues have ob-
served, "posting works to the Internet makes them 'generally 
known'" at least to the relevant people interested in the news 
group. Once a trade secret is posted on the Internet, it is 
effectively part of the public domain, impossible to 
retrieve. 229 
In the more recent case of Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics 
Corp.,230 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
took a different position with regard to trade secrets that were filed in 
an open court file but not posted on the Internet. In that case, a party 
had inadvertently filed documents, which it alleged were trade secrets, 
in another court proceeding.231 The documents had been in the 
open court file for several months.232 The Fourth Circuit referred to 
the Lerma case, but reached a different result: 
In holding that the [Scientology Church's] works were not 
trade secrets when the Post acquired them, the court specifi-
cally relied on both of these factors [documents in an open 
224. /d. 
225. /d. 
226. /d. 
227. /d. at 1368. 
228. /d. 
229. /d. (citations omitted). 
230. 174 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999). 
231. /d. at 415. 
232. /d. 
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court file for 28 months and published on the Internet]. 
First, it noted that the documents' extended presence in the 
court's public files - from which the Post had obtained its 
own copy - made them no longer secret. Importantly, 
though, the court reasoned that the documents' posting on 
the Internet was "[o]f even more significance" than their ex-
tended presence in public records: "posting works to the In-
ternet makes them "generally known" at least to the relevant 
people interested in the news group." As a result, the court 
correctly found that the information which had been both 
disclosed in public court files and made "generally known" 
by Internet publication had lost its trade secret status.233 
The Hoechst court believed that there was no suggestion that the 
document was published on the Internet. The only issue was whether 
it was present in the district court's public files. 234 The court held 
that, under the Act, the mere presence of the information "in the 
district court's public files, in and of itself, did not make the informa-
tion contained in the document 'generally known' for purposes of the 
Act."235 
The court concluded that there was a material difference between 
information deposited in an open court file available to the public 
and information available on the Internet.236 Of course, the informa-
tion is publicly available in both instances. 237 However, the Hoechst 
court determined that information in an open court file may or may 
not be generally known, but it is generally known if it is posted on the 
Internet.238 While the logic of this is debatable, the distinction that 
the court is making is rational. The contents of court files are publicly 
available but are not as accessible as information posted on the In-
ternet.239 However, if and when court files become available on the 
Internet, the distinction made by the Court in the Hoechst case may be 
less meaningful.240 At some not too distant time, this current distinc-
tion may again be the subject of litigation. 
233. !d. at 419. 
234. !d. 
235. !d. (citing Religious Tech. Center v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. 
Va. 1995). 
236. !d. 
237. To see how the information was publicly available in Lerma see supra notes 
225-29. To see how the information was publicly available in Hoechst see 
infra notes 238-40. 
238. Hoechst, 174 F.3d at 419. 
239. !d. at 419 (noting that the information deposited in the district court's pub-
lic files "in and of itself, did not make the information contained in the 
document 'generally known'"). 
240. For discussions of trade secrets and the Internet, see Victoria A. Cundiff, 
Trade Secrets and the Internet: A Practical Perspective, 14 No.8 CoMPUTER LAw. 
6 (1997); Bruce T. Atkins, Trading Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade 
Secret Law Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 1151 (1996). 
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In Montgomery County Association of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master 
Corporation,241 a voluntary association of realtors brought an action al-
leging, among other things, a misappropriation of a trade secret by a 
photographic service.242 The realtors' association had a database of 
real estate listings that the photo service used to provide realtors with 
photographs of real estate.243 Named the "Multiple Listing Service," 
the database was a computerized listing of real estate in the Montgom-
ery County area available for sale, which the plaintiff compiled and 
disseminated to its members.244 The court found that the "informa-
tion in the MLS database [was] not a secret; to the contrary, it is dis-
tributed widely to its realtor members and potential purchasers."245 
In essence, the court held that the information was generally known 
to the industry because it was not kept secret, but was widely distrib-
uted in the industry.246 
F. Requirement that Trade Secrets Not Be Readily Ascertainable 
The Maryland Act and the Uniform Act also require that a trade 
secret not be readily ascertainable by proper means.247 The Commen-
tary to the Uniform Act lists several proper means, including: 1. Dis-
covery by independent invention; 2. Reverse engineering; 3. Discovery 
under a license; 4. Observing the product or service on public use or 
display; and 5. Review of publicly available literature.248 
While the Maryland Act contains a requirement that a trade secret 
not be generally known, there is no line in the sand as to when infor-
mation is readily ascertainable. 249 This is also a factual issue that is 
often litigated.250 A common example in trade secret litigation is the 
241. 878 F. Supp. 804 (D. Md. 1995). 
242. !d. at 804. 
243. /d. at 808-09. 
244. /d. at 808. 
245. /d. at 814. 
246. /d. 
247. In a case of misappropriation of trade secrets, the Uniform Act requires 
that the secret be acquired through improper means. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS 
AcT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 438. The Uniform Act defines "improper means" to 
include "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of breach 
of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other 
means." !d. The Maryland Act contains identical language. See Mo. ConE 
ANN., CoM. LAw II§ ll-1201(b). 
248. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 1 cmt, 14 U.L.A. 439. 
249. See infra Part III.F. 
250. See Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating 
that the identities of opthamologists who were high volume implanters of 
manufacturers' lenses were not readily ascertainable); see also Eaton Corp. 
v. Appliance Valves Co., 634 F. Supp. 974, 980-81 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (holding 
that patent information readily available to the public and removed from 
employer's files did not amount to a misappropriation of trade secrets and 
confidential information); Crown Holding Corp. v. Larson, 410 N.W.2d 
373, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that a confidentiality agreement 
terminated with the lifting of a temporary restraining order). 
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case of a departing employee who takes the customer list with him 
when he departs to work at a competing business, which may even be 
the employee's own start up company. The former employer will ar-
gue that its customer list was developed only after many years of effort 
and great expenditures on advertising, client development, and sala-
ries for salesmen. On the other hand, the departing employee, who 
has appropriated the list, will argue that the customer list constitutes 
information which is readily ascertainable through common business 
sources such as telephone books, trade magazines, or published indus-
try information sources. 
The seminal case in Maryland on this topic is Fulton Grand Laundry 
Co. v.johnson.251 In this case,Johnson, an employee of a laundry com-
pany, drove a laundry route as part of his required duties.252 Mter 
three years of employment, Johnson departed from the laundry com-
pany and started his own laundry business.253 Before he left, Johnson 
solicited the customers of his previous laundry route. 254 The court 
held that the identity of the laundry customers on the laundry route 
was not a trade secret because those identities could be readily ascer-
tained by merely observing the driver on his laundry route.255 
In 1989, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland decided the case 
of Alan M. Dworkin, D.D.S., P.A. v. Blumenthal,256 a case that predated 
the Maryland Act.257 There, a professional association of dentists 
sought injunctive relief, accounting, and damages from dentists for-
merly in practice with the association, alleging wrongful use of patient 
information and unfair competition.258 The departing dentists com-
piled a list of patients from the records of the professional association 
before their employment with the professional association ended.259 
Mter resigning from the professional association, the departing den-
tists mailed relocation announcements only to patients for whom they 
had been the primary dentist.260 The relocation announcements did 
not solicit the patient's business.261 The court found that the patient 
list was not kept secret and that the departing dentists had a profes-
251. 140 Md. 359, 117 A. 753 (1922). 
252. !d. at 360, 117 A. at 753. 
253. !d. 
254. !d. 
255. !d. at 361-62, 117 A. at 753-54. 
256. 77 Md. App. 774, 551 A.2d 947 (1989). 
257. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining that the Maryland Act 
was passed in 1980). 
258. Blumenthal, 77 Md. App. at 778, 551 A.2d at 948. 
259. !d. at 777, 551 A.2d at 948. 
260. !d. at 780, 551 A.2d at 949. 
261. See id. (noting that the announcements only informed patients of the 
change of address and did not purport to offer superior services). 
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sional duty to inform their patients of their relocation. 262 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the patient list was not a trade secret.263 
In Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee,264 the court of special appeals, apply-· 
ing the Maryland Act, held that a marketing strategy was not a trade 
secret because the information was easily obtainable from the market-
place.265 At trial, the circuit court concluded that Optic's marketing 
strategy could be readily ascertained simply by talking with prospec-
tive purchasers of Optics.266 Furthermore, the trial court found that 
Optic's marketing strategy was subject to change and therefore useless 
to a competitor.267 
In Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. FMC Corp./ Agricultural Products 
Group,268 FMC, a manufacturer, gave a customer list ofYork, a distrib-
utor and subsidiary of Home Paramount Pest Control Companies, to 
one of York's principal competitors.269 The plaintiff alleged this to be 
a misappropriation of a trade secret, while FMC asserted that the list 
was readily ascertainable.270 The customer list provided the names, 
addresses, and phone numbers of York's top fifty customers.271 Ap-
parently, the details of the prices and quantities of each product pur-
chased by each customer were not disclosed. 272 The court found that 
the names and addresses ofYork's customers were obtainable through 
public sources, such as the phone directory and trade associations. 273 
The plaintiff argued that it put substantial effort into compiling the 
information on the list and that FMC actually paid for it.274 The court 
concluded that such information could be "gathered as a matter of 
course as part ofYork's day-to-day operations."275 
However, in the case of Motor City Bagels, L.L. C. v. American Bagel 
Co.,276 the United States District Court for the District of Maryland 
found that a business plan was a trade secret even though the business 
plan contained some facts ascertainable from the market place and 
some public information.277 In this case, two recent business school 
graduates were investigating and negotiating the purchase of a bagel 
franchise, and prepared an extensive business plan assessing the via-
262. Id. at 782, 551 A.2d at 950-51. 
263. Id. at 782, 551 A.2d at 951. 
264. 87 Md. App. 770, 591 A. 2d 578 (1991). 
265. Id. at 788, 591 A. 2d 587. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. at 787-88, 591 A.2d at 587. 
268. 107 F. Supp. 2d 684 (D. Md. 2000). 
269. Id. at 688. 
270. Id. at 692. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at 693. 
274. Id. at 693 
275. Id. 
276. 50 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D. Md. 1999). 
277. Id. at 479. 
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bility of a bagel franchise. 278 The franchisor with whom they were 
negotiating disclosed the plan to other prospective franchisees. 279 
The court held that "while the business plan at issue [did] contain 
some public information and facts ascertainable from the market-
place, it likewise include[d] personal insights and analysis brought to 
bear through diligent research and by marshaling a large volume of 
information."280 Unlike the marketing strategy in Optic Graphics, an 
attempt to independently duplicate the business plan would require 
extensive research and analysis. 281 
While the Maryland Act is clear that information that is generally 
known or readily ascertainable cannot be a trade secret, combinations 
of generally known information, combinations of readily ascertainable 
information, and combinations of both, can be trade secrets. In Motor 
City Bagel, the court stated that "(t]he fact that individual forms in 
marketing material or in plaintiff's proposal book were compilations 
of public information does not itself preclude a finding that the com-
bination of the included elements affords a competitive advantage 
and is not itself in the public domain."282 The court also cited, with 
approval, the Fourth Circuit, stating that "although a trade secret can-
not subsist in information in the public domain, it can subsist in a 
combination of such information as long as the combination is itself a 
secret. "283 
G. Requirement of Reasonable Efforts to Maintain Secrecy 
The Maryland Act and the Uniform Act also provide that a trade 
secret is protectable only if it "is the subject of efforts that are reasona-
ble under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."284 There are no 
qualifications or exceptions to this requirement. However, it is also 
clear from this quoted language that complete secrecy is not re-
quired. 285 Sensibly, trade secret protection is not lost if the trade se-
cret isodisclosed in confidence to those that need to know it, such as 
employees, agents, suppliers, subcontractors, and others.286 However, 
courts have also interpreted this language to require that a trade se-
cret owner demonstrate that he pursued an active course of conduct 
278. Id. at 466. 
279. /d. at 478. 
280. /d. at 479. 
281. Id. 
282. Molar City Bagel, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 479 (citing Nat'I Risk Mgmt., Inc. v. Bram-
well, 819 F. Supp. 417, 431-32 (E.D. Pa. 1993)). 
283. /d. (citing Comprehensive Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 
730, 736 (4th Cir. 1993)). 
284. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1201 (e) (2); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT 
§ 1(4)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 439. 
285. See Tabs Assocs., Inc. v. Brohawn, 59 Md. App. 330, 475, A.2d 1203 (1984). 
286. Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting & Packaging, 397 S.E.2d 110, 113 
(Va. 1990) (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 
(1974)). 
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to keep the information secret.287 Doing nothing is not enough, even 
though doing nothing has been good enough in the past to protect 
the secret. 288 It is also true that while the owner of a trade secret must 
demonstrate active conduct, the trade secret "owner need not take 
heroic measures."289 
In some cases, courts have held that not much is required to protect 
information as a trade secret. In Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting & 
Packaging,290 the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the circuit court's 
decision that the foam company had used reasonable efforts to main-
tain the secrecy of its trade secret, referring only to the fact that the 
company had required confidential information agreements from all 
its "employees, suppliers, customers, and contractors .... "291 How-
ever, in many cases, a court will look much more closely at the facts of 
the case. In a Fourth Circuit case applying the Maryland Act, the 
court closely looked at the facts to determine if reasonable efforts 
were employed to maintain secrecy. In Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson 
Co.,292 the developer and owner of a software program that designed 
subway tunnels sued a licensee and its contractor, the Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, for misappropriation of that 
trade secret.293 The defendants argued that the information was not a 
trade secret because the software was widely disclosed, mass marketed, 
and that its existence and its abilities were not secret.294 The defend-
ants further argued that the plaintiff software owner even offered a 
demonstration version of the software for sale for $100.295 However, 
the court looked closely at the facts, found that only six or seven peo-
ple inquired about the demonstration version, and none were sold.296 
In deciding the case, the court found that the owner took measures 
that were reasonable under the circumstances to protect the seuecy 
of the software.297 Additionally, the court found that the company 
licensed only two object code versions of its software and they were 
licensed under a confidentiality agreement, the company used a pass-
word to prevent access to the program in-house and for licensed ver-
287. Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 282 N.E.2d 921, 925 (Mass. 1972). 
288. Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 60 A. 4 (Pa. 1904) (holding 
that there was an implied agreement of secrecy between the plaintiff and its 
customers, who were provided with blueprints as a means of facilitating 
transactions). 
289. CoHEN & GuTTERMAN, supra note 13, at 15 n.51. 
290. 397 S.E.2d llO (Va. 1990). 
291. Id. at ll2, 114. 
292. 996 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1993). 
293. Id. at 657. 
294. Id. at 663. 
295. Id. at 663-64. 
296. Id. at 664. 
297. Id. 
214 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 31 
sions, and there was no other unauthorized person who ever obtained 
a copy of the software.298 
Of course, efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances will 
vary from case to case. Some examples are: 
1. [C]lassifying and labeling certain documents as trade secrets; 
2. restricting access to certain materials or areas; 
3. limiting disclosures within the company only to those individ-
uals who need the trade secrets in order to perform their jobs 
properly; 
4. implementing badge or other electronic monitoring systems; 
5. advising employees of the existence of trade secrets and con-
ditioning employment on signing confidentiality agreements; 
6. requiring consultants, customers, vendors, and ancillary ser-
vice providers to sign confidentiality agreements; 
7. implementing periodic internal review procedures regarding 
inventions, periodicals, marketing materials, and government 
filings; 
8. restricting access to computers, copiers, fax machines, and 
trash receptacles; 
9. performing security checks of employees, visitors, and others 
with access to trade secrets; and 
10. using protective orders when disclosing trade secrets in the 
course of litigation. 299 
Not only does the trade secret owner have to take measures that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to protect the secrecy of the trade 
secret, the trade secret owner must also make sure its licensee also 
takes such measures. In Home Paramount Pest Control Companies, Inc., 300 
the court held that even if the owner of a trade secret meets the se-
crecy requirements of the Maryland Act, it must also make sure, if it 
licenses the trade secret to another, that the owner takes steps to 
make sure that the licensee also treats the information as secret. 301 If 
the owner does not, any disclosure by the licensee of the information 
to others may not be protected by the Maryland Act. 
A lawyer must advise and assist his clients with regard to measures to 
protect trade secrets. Today's numerous trade secret law suits, not 
only in Maryland, but all over the country, are ad hoc testimonials to 
the fact that many companies still do not take measures that are rea-
sonable under the circumstances to protect their trade secrets. 302 A 
trade secret owner may well consider the implementation of a trade 
secret protection program, designed by counsel, to protect such 
298. /d. 
299. CoHEN & GUTrERMAN, supra note 13, at 89-90. 
300. 107 F. Supp. 2d 684 (D. Md. 2000). 
301. !d. at 693. 
302. See supra Part III. 
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secrets from disclosure and to increase the owner's probability of suc-
cess in future litigation involving the misappropriation of the trade 
secret.303 
H. Respondeat Superior 
While there does not appear to be any case in Maryland determin-
ing whether the Maryland Act precludes the application of the doc-
trine of respondeat superior,304 a recent case in Virginia held that the 
Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act (''Virginia Act") does not pre-
clude the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. In New-
port News Industrial v. Dynamic Testing, Inc., 305 a long-time employee of 
a ship building company invented and helped develop a shock mount 
for electric equipment for use by the United States Navy.306 The ship 
building company asked DTI, a testing company, to test the mount.307 
The employee, who invented the mount, was hired by the testing com-
pany and immediately began work on developing a competing shock 
mount.308 From the employee's computer at the shipbuilding com-
pany, and while still employed by the company, the employee had de-
tailed the design of the competing mount.309 The shipbuilding 
company brought an action against the testing company and its sub-
sidiaries on numerous counts, including misappropriation of trade se-
cret.310 Defendant claimed that they could not be vicariously liable 
for the misappropriation because the Virginia Act precluded the im-
position of liability under the theory of respondeat superior.311 The de-
fendants contended that the Virginia Act failed to explicitly provide 
for respondeat superior liability and that the Virginia Act's preemptive 
provision precluded the application of the doctrine.312 The Virginia 
Act's preemptive provision states that this chapter" 'displaces conflict-
ing tort, restitutionary, and other law of this Commonwealth provid-
ing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.' "31 ~ This 
303. See Richard C. McCrea, Jr., Protecting Trade Secrets & Confidential Business 
Infrmnation (with Farms), 44 PRAc. LAw. 71 (July 1998). 
304. BLAcK's LAw DrcnoNARY 1313 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "respondeat supe-
rior" as "[t]he doctrine holding an employer or principal liable for the em-
ployee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope of 
employment or agency"). 
305. 130 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
306. Id. at 746. 
307. Id. at 747. 
308. Id. at 747-48. 
309. Id. at 748. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. at 750. 
312. Id. (noting the VA. CODE ANN.§ 59.1- 341 (Mitchie 2001)). 
313. Id. 
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Virginia provision is similar in all material aspects to the Maryland 
provision at Section 11-1207.314 
In its opinion, the court, citing the Restatement (Second) of Agenry'n5 
and Virginia case law,316 held that "the doctrine of respondent supe-
rior is thoroughly ensconced in Virginia law"317 and that the preemp-
tive provision of the Virginia Act does not displace the doctrine of 
respondeat superior because that doctrine is a "legal precept that presup-
poses the existence of an underlying claim and assesses liability not 
because of the act giving rise to the claim but because of a certain 
status."318 The court noted that reaching this result was consistent 
with the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in similar 
contexts, such as Virginia's conspiracy to "injure others in trade or 
business statute" and the Lanham Act.319 
N. OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE ACT 
A. Equitable Relief 
Because of the nature of the injury suffered from a misappropria-
tion of a trade secret, money damages may be an inadequate form of 
relief and equitable relief may be necessary. In recognition of this, 
section ll-1202(a) of the Maryland Act and section 2(a) of the Uni-
form Act specifically provide that a court may order an injunction in 
the case of actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade secret. 320 
A court order imposing the i~unction can provide that the injunction 
shall terminate when the trade secret has ceased to exist.321 However, 
a court may continue the injunction for an even longer period in or-
der to eliminate any commercial advantage that otherwise would be 
derived from the misappropriation of a trade secret.322 It is notable 
that even threatened misappropriation is the proper subject of an in-
junction under both Acts. 323 However, it is unclear how a threat of 
misappropriation fits within the Maryland and Uniform Act's defini-
tion of misappropriation, because, as we have seen, the definition of 
misappropriation only refers to the acquisition, use, or disclosure of 
314. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ 11-1207; VA. ConE ANN.§ 59.1-344 (Mitchie 
2001). 
315. Newport News, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 749. 
316. Id. at 750 (citing Giant ofMd., Inc. v. Eager, 515 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1999)). 
317. Id. 
318. Id. at 751. 
319. Id. at 754 n.8. 
320. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § ll-1202(a); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT 
§ 2(a), 14 U.L.A. 449. 
321. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § ll-1202(b); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT 
§ 2(b), 14 U.L.A. 449. 
322. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § ll-1202(b); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT 
§ 2(b), 14 U.L.A. 449. 
323. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1202(a); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT 
§ 2(a), 14 U.L.A. 449. 
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trade secrets and does not have any language specifically referring to 
the threat thereof. 324 
When the Conference adopted various amendments to the Uni-
form Act in 1985, one of those amendments added language to sub-
part b of section 2 of the Uniform Act concerning injunctive relief in 
the case of "exceptional circumstances."325 This new language is also 
in the Maryland Act. The new Maryland language provides that: 
(c) Payment of royalty -In exceptional circumstances, an in-
junction may condition future use upon payment of a rea-
sonable royalty for no longer than the period of time for 
which use could have been prohibited .... 
(e) "Exceptional circumstances defined"- In this section, "ex-
ceptional circumstances" includes, a material and prejudicial 
change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to 
know of misappro~riation that renders a prohibitive injunc-
tion inequitable.32 
B. Damages 
1. Actual Loss, Unjust Enrichment, and Reasonable Royalty 
Section 11-1203 of the Maryland Act and section 3 of the Uniform 
Act provide that damages for the misappropriation of a trade secret 
can include damages for actual loss to the trade secret owner.327 The 
Acts also provide for those damages stemming from the misap-
propriator's unjust enrichment that were not factored into the com-
putation of actual loss.328 In addition, both Acts state that damages 
can also be measured by a reasonable royalty in lieu of any other 
damages.329 
324. Mn. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ 11-1202(c); see also supra notes 118,65 and 
accompanying text. 
325. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 2(b), 14 U.L.A. 449; see also supra notes 59-60 
and accompanying text. 
326. Mn. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ 11-1202(c),(e). 
327. ld. § 11-1203; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 3(a), 14 U.L.A. 455. 
328. Mn. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1203(b) (stating that damages may in-
clude "[t]he unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not 
taken into account in computing actual loss"); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr 
§ 3(a), 14 U.L.A. 455 (stating that "[d]amages can include ... the unjust 
enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account com-
puting actual loss"). 
329. Mn. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1203(c); UNrF. TRADE SECRETS AcT 
§ 3(a), 14 U.L.A. 455. One commentator has even argued that the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corruption Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 
(1994) (RICO) is applicable to causes of action based on the misappropria-
tion of trade secrets. See Thomas P. Heed, Comment, Misappropriation of 
Trade Secrets: The Last Civil RICO Cause of Action That Works, 30 J. MARsHALL 
L. REv. 207, 235-42 (1996). RICO provides for treble damages and legal 
fees. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
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Measuring damages by a royalty amount instead of actual loss or 
ur~ust enrichment is an interesting option for plaintiffs. Such a mea-
surement option may be advantageous for some plaintiffs for a num-
ber of reasons. First, plaintiffs may not be able to readily determine 
their own actual losses because the defendant may have kept the mis-
appropriation a secret and the plaintiff may not be aware of or be able 
to reasonably calculate the effects of the misappropriation of plain-
tiff's trade secret or business. Second, plaintiffs may not be able to 
calculate the defendant's unjust enrichment because the defendant 
may not fully disclose or properly calculate the amount he has prof-
ited as a result of the misappropriation. Thus, a royalty amount may 
be much easier for the plaintiff to prove because the information con-
cerning its own trade secret is readily available and the plaintiff is al-
ready aware of its value. 
From a defendant's point of view, however, measuring damages by a 
royalty amount may be disadvantageous. For instance, because the de-
fendant may only have had the secret for a short time, may not have 
been able to use it to its full potential, and may not have generated 
much money from it because it was wrongfully obtained, the defen-
dant may suffer a greater loss if damages are measured by a reasona-
ble royalty. Also, in some cases the defendant may not have all of the 
facts concerning the secret to be able to disprove the alleged value 
that the plaintiff attributes to the secret. 
Maryland may have one of the very few reported cases concerning 
the measurement of damages by awarding a reasonable royalty.330 In 
Motor City Bagels, L.L.C. v. American Bagel, Co.,331 the court, applying 
Virginia's unjust enrichment law, found that the plaintiffs had not in-
troduced any evidence establishing that the defendants "were en-
riched 'at the expense of the plaintiffs."332 Citing section 11-1203 (b) 
of the Maryland Act, the court concluded that the plaintiffs "could 
have argued that they were entitled to monetary damages in the form 
of royalties as a result of the defendants' unauthorized distribution of 
their business plan to prospective franchises." 333 
2. Exemplary Damages 
Under section 11-1203 (d) of the Maryland Act and section 3(b) of 
the Uniform Act, a court may award exemplary damages, not exceed-
ing twice the award for general misappropriation damages, if there is 
330. For one of the few reported cases discussing measuring damages by a roy-
alty amount, see American Sales Corp. v. Adventure Travel, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 
1476 (E.D. Va. 1994), amended by 867 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Va. 1994) (amend-
ing the court's awarding of attorney fees). 
331. 50 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D. Md. 1999). 
332. !d. at 477-78. 
333. !d. at 4 79-80. 
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a willful and malicious misappropriation.334 Some states do not have 
any punitive or exemplary damages provision in their state uniform 
trade secrets act.335 Other states that do award punitive or exemplary 
damages in their uniform trade secrets acts have a cap on their dam-
age provisions. 336 
C. Attorney Fees 
Section 11-1204 of the Maryland Act and section 4 of the Uniform 
Act specifically provide that a court may award reasonable attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party if there is a willful and malicious misappro-
priation.337 Both Acts also provide that reasonable attorney's fees will 
be awarded if a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith or if a 
motion to terminate an injunction is made or requested in bad 
faith. 338 Although "willful and malicious" and "bad faith" are two dif-
ferent standards, the use of different standards may nonetheless be 
appropriate because the types of acts and actors are different. 339 How-
ever, both bad faith and willful and malicious are interpreted by the 
courts to require egregious conduct of a similar degree. 340 As the fol-
334. 
335. 
336. 
337. 
338. 
339. 
340. 
Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1203(d); UNrF. TRADE SECRETS Acr 
§ 3(b), 14 U.L.A. 455. 
A few of the states that do not have any punitive or exemplary damage 
provision in their state uniform trade secrets act are Arkansas, Michigan, 
Mississippi, and Nebraska. See ARK. ConE ANN.§ 4-75-606 (2001) (allowing 
damages only for actual loss and unjust enrichment caused by misappropri-
ation); MrcH. CoMP. LAws§ 445.1904 (Supp. 2001) (permitting a plaintiff 
to recover damages for actual loss and unjust enrichment caused by misap-
propriation); Mrss. ConE ANN. § 75-26-7 (1999) (failing to state whether a 
court may award punitive and exemplary damages); NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-
504 (1999) (failing to address whether a plaintiff may be awarded any ex-
emplary damages). 
States that have some type of cap for punitive or exemplary damages provi-
sions are Alabama, Colorado, and Idaho. See ALA. ConE§§ 8-27-4 (1993) 
(permitting an award of exemplary damages that may not "exceed the ac-
tual award made under subdivision (1)"); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 7-74-104 
(1999) (stating that a court may award exemplary damages in an amount 
not exceeding the award made under subsection ( 1) of their section"); 
IDAHO CoDE§ 48-803 (1997) (stating that "the court may award exemplary 
damages in amount not exceeding twice any award made under subsection 
(1) of this section"). 
Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ 11-1204; UNrF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 4, 14 
U.L.A. 459; see also Mo. R. 1-341. 
Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1204; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 4, 14 
U.L.A. 459. 
See Am. Sales, 862 F. Supf-. at 1480-81 (explaining that "willful and mali-
cious" conduct requires il -will and is a very high standard to meet for puni-
tive damages); see also Optic Graphics, 87 Md. App. at 789-90, 591 A.2d at 587-
88 (noting that an example of bad faith is continuing a court action for 
malicious reasons and that proving bad faith requires clear evidence that 
the action was without merit and taken for improper purposes). 
For a discussion of egregious punitive damages in willful and malicious 
cases, see Am. Sales, 862 F. Supp. at 1480-81. For a discussion of egregious 
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lowing cases demonstrate, the award of attorney's fees under the Ma-
ryland Act is difficult to achieve. 
For instance, in Bond v. PolyCycle, Inc., 341 the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland considered the award of attorney fees under the 
Maryland Act.342 Here, a company president developed and modified 
plastic recycling technology and a machine both which were trade 
secrets of the company.343 When he left the company, he misappro-
priated the trade secrets, taking all of the information pertaining to 
the technology with him. 344 In addition, he deleted all of the infor-
mation from the corporation's computers.345 
The Bond court affirmed the trial court's finding that the president 
had willfully and maliciously misappropriated the company's trade se-
cret and upheld its award of attorney's fees. 346 However, in reaching a 
decision, the court focused not on the misappropriation of the secret 
technique, but on the deletion of the files from PolyCycle's com-
puters, which the court found harmed PolyCycle from carrying out its 
stated corporate purpose.347 
In Optic Graphics, 348 claims of breach of a written confidentiality 
agreement and misappropriation of a trade secret were before the 
court. 349 During the course of the case, it was determined that the 
alleged confidentiality agreement of the former employee was actually 
forged, bringing into question whether the breach of contract claim 
should have been brought or maintained even after the forgery had 
been determined.350 The court reversed the trial court's imposition 
of attorney fees and expenses based on the allegation that the claim of 
misappropriation of a trade secret was filed in bad faith. 351 However, 
punitive damages in bad faith cases, see optic Graphics, 87 Md. App. 789, 
591 A.2d at 587-88. 
341. 127 Md. App. 365, 732 A.2d 970 (1999). 
342. /d. at 380-83, 732 A.2d at 977-79. 
343. /d. at 369-70, 732 A.2d at 972. See also supra notes 214-16 and accompany-
ing text for a more detailed discussion of the facts and holding of this case. 
344. Bond, 127 Md. App. at 370, 732 A.2d at 972; see also supra note 213 and 
accompanying text. 
345. Bond, 127 Md. App. at 370, 732 A.2d at 972; see also supra note 213 and 
accompanying text. 
346. Bond, 127 Md. App. at 384-85, 732 A.2d at 979-80. The Bond court defined 
"willfull," stating that "[i]n a civil action the word [willfully] often denotes 
an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from 
accidental." /d. at 381, 732 A.2d at 978 (citing BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 
1600 (7th ed. 1999)). It also defined "malice" as "the intentional doing of a 
wrongful act without legal justification or excuse. An act is malicious if it is 
done knowingly and deliberately, for an improper motive and without legal 
justification." /d. at 382, 732 A.2d at 978 (citing Elliott v. Kapferman, 58 
Md. App. 510, 526, 475 A.2d. 960 (1984)). 
347. /d. at 377-80, 732 A.2d at 97fr.77. 
348. 87 Md. App. 770, 591 A.2d 578 (1991). 
349. /d. at 770, 591 A.2d at 578. 
350. /d. at 779, 591 A.2d at 582-83. 
351. /d. at 794, 591 A.2d at 590. 
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the court remanded to the lower court that portion of the case con-
cerning the claim for attorney fees and expenses related to breach of 
the contract claim.352 
D. Preservation of Secrecy 
During the course of a court proceeding, section 11-1205 of the 
Maryland Act and section 5 of the Uniform Act require that a court 
"preserve the secrecy of [any] alleged trade secret by reasonable 
means .... "353 Both the Uniform Act and Maryland Act set forth 
examples of means by which an alleged trade secret can be preserved, 
including (1) protective orders during discovery; (2) in camera hear-
ings; (3) sealing records; and (4) ordering persons involved in the 
litigation not to disclose the information.354 
Of course, the parties and the court can also protect the secrecy of 
discoverable information under the Maryland Rules by stipulation355 
and by motion for protective order.356 In most cases, it may be in the 
best interest of all of the parties involved to agree to protect this infor-
mation because quite frequently in trade secret litigation the alleged 
trade secrets of both plaintiff and defendant are discoverable. In such 
cases, counsel for all of the parties may prepare and submit to the 
court a joint motion for a protective order as well as a proposed order 
to restrict the disclosure of confidential information in discovery, dep-
ositions, hearings, and at trial. Such a protective order may have pro-
visions allowing: (1) limited disclosure of specified information to 
counsel and parties; and (2) limited disclosure of other specified in-
formation to counsel only or special masters only. Submitting such an 
order often minimizes legal fees and court time. 
E. Statute of Limitations 
Section 11-1206 of the Maryland Act and section 6 of the Uniform 
Act set forth a statute of limitations of three years for misappropria-
tion actions. 357 This three year period starts after the misappropria-
tion is discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence.358 Two states, Illinois and Maine, have, respec-
352. /d. at 795, 591 A.2d at 590. 
353. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1205; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 5, 14 
U.L.A. 461. 
354. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1205; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 5, 14 
U.L.A. 461. 
355. Mo. R. 2-401 (g). 
356. Mo. R. 2-403(a) (8). 
357. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1206; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 6, 14 
U.L.A. 462. 
358. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1206; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 6, 14 
U.L.A. 462. 
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tively, a five and four year statute of limitations in their uniform trade 
secrets acts. 359 
F. Effect on Other Law 
Section 11-1207 of the Maryland Act and section 7 of the Uniform 
Act state that the Acts displace conflicting existing law providing for 
remedies for misappropriation of trade secrets. 360 The Acts do not 
effect: (1) contractual remedies; (2) other civil remedies not based on 
misappropriation of trade secrets; and (3) criminal remedies. 361 Fur-
thermore, the Commentary to the Uniform Act specifically states that 
the Uniform Act is not intended to affect the law concerning contrac-
tual provisions prohibiting disclosure of trade secrets and covenants 
by employees not to compete against their employers.362 
An interesting question arises as to whether debts related to misap-
propriation can be discharged in bankruptcy. Certainly if a disgrun-
tled employee misappropriates a trade secret and his former employer 
obtains a judgment against him, the employee may file for bank-
ruptcy, whether this debt is discharged in bankruptcy is beyond the 
scope of this Article.363 
V. CONCLUSION 
Twelve years have passed since the Maryland legislature enacted the 
Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act.364 During this time, Maryland 
courts have decided numerous cases under the Maryland Act that 
have interpreted the Act's provisions.365 A critical review of the Act 
and much of the reported Maryland trade secrets case law suggests 
that the Maryland Act currently meets the needs of both the high-tech 
and low-tech trade secret litigants for a unified and comprehensive 
body of law. 366 The increasing volume of case law under the Act re-
flects a continuing need for this unified and comprehensive body of 
law governing the protection of trade secrets. This case law also sug-
gests that many Maryland businesses are not making efforts that are 
359. See 765 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/7 (West 2001); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 10, 
§ 1547 (West 1997). 
360. Mo. CooE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1206; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 76, 14 
U.L.A. 463. 
361. Mo. CooE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1206; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 7, 14 
U.L.A. 463. 
362. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 7 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 463. Nevada and South Caro-
lina have criminal penalties for the theft of a trade secret. See NEv. REv. 
STAT. ANN.§ 600A.035 (Mitchie 2001); S.C. CooE ANN.§ 39-8-90 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 2001). 
363. See generally Beverly A. Berneman, Caveat Trade Secret Misappropriator: The 
Discharge of Trade Secret Misappropriation Debts, III J. MARsHALL CENTER FOR 
INTELL. PROP. L. NEws SouRCE 3, Winter 2002. 
364. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
365. See supra Parts III and IV. 
366. See supra Parts III and IV. 
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reasonable under the circumstances to maintain the secrecy of their 
trade secrets.367 Accordingly, Maryland lawyers should advise their cli-
ents of the need for a comprehensive and demonstrable program to 
establish and maintain efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain the secrecy of such trade secrets. 
367. See supra Parts III and N. 
